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Abstract
Inheritance is the principle that deontic ‘ought’ is closed under entail-
ment. This paper is about a tension that arises in connection with
Inheritance. More specifically, it is about two observations that pull in
opposite directions. One of them raises questions about the validity of
Inheritance, while the other appears to provide strong support for it.
We argue that existing approaches to deontic modals fail to provide us
with an adequate resolution of this tension. In response, we develop
a positive analysis, and show that this proposal provides a satisfying
account of our intuitions.
1 Introduction
Inheritance is the principle that deontic ‘ought’ (and its cognates, e.g.
‘must’, ‘has to’, etc.) is closed under entailment:1
Inheritance If p |= q, then ought p |= ought q
This paper is about a tension that arises in connection with Inheritance.
More specifically, it is about two observations that pull in opposite direc-
tions. One of them raises questions about the validity of Inheritance, while
*To appear in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
1We assume that ‘ought’ takes a sentential, proposition-denoting complement. This is
common practice in philosophical semantics, but it isn’t essential to our arguments. For
instance, if one thinks that ‘ought’ instead takes predicates (Schroeder, 2011), then one
could formulate Inheritance using a notion of predicate entailment (Schlenker, 2009). The
rest of the dialectic would then proceed as below, mutatis mutandis.
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the other appears to provide strong support for it. To illustrate the first,
consider a famous case originally discussed by Jackson & Pargetter (1986),
and made sharper by Cariani (2013):
Procrastinate: Prof. Procrastinate is invited to review a book
on which he is the only fully qualified specialist on the planet.
Procrastinate’s notable character flaw, however, is his inability
to bring projects to completion. In particular, if Procrastinate
accepts to review the book, it is extremely likely (but not certain)
that he will not end up writing the review. In the eyes of the
editor, and of the whole scientific community, this is the worst
possible outcome. If Procrastinate declines, someone else will
write the review—someone less qualified than him, but more
reliable.
(1) a. Prof. Procrastinate ought to accept.
b. Prof. Procrastinate ought to accept and write.
Many have the intuition that (1a) sounds false in context. After all, if Pro-
crastinate were to accept, he’d very likely not write the review, which would
be very bad. By contrast, (1b) is clearly true, since Procrastinate accepting
and writing is the best outcome. But this constellation of judgments puts
pressure on Inheritance, since Procrastinate accepts and writes obviously
entails Procrastinate accepts.
On the other hand, theorists have also pointed out that one cannot fe-
licitously conjoin (1b) with the negation of (1a) (Crnič, 2011; von Fintel,
2012):2
2We use ‘have to’ in these examples since English constructions which feature negation
outscoping ‘ought’ tend to sound awkward, e.g. ‘It’s not the case that Procrastinate ought
to accept and write’ (von Fintel, 2012; Iatridou & Zeijlstra, 2013). Another way to get
around this problem is to use verbs that lexicalize negation, e.g. ‘doubt’, as in (2):
(2) a. # I’m certain Procrastinate ought to accept and write, but I doubt he ought
to accept.
b. # I doubt Procrastinate ought to accept, but I’m certain he ought to accept
and write.
But it is more straightforward to work with unembedded sentences, so we stick with
the examples in (3). Note that there are well-known differences between ‘ought’ and ‘have
to’ (von Fintel & Iatridou, 2008). However, these aren’t relevant for our purposes, so we
ignore them here.
We also note that analogues of (3) where negation takes narrow-scope in the second
conjunct are unacceptable, for example ‘Prof. Procrastinate ought to accept and write,
but he ought not accept’. These examples also militate in favor of Inheritance given the
plausible principle of “deontic non-contradiction”: pought pq and pought ¬pq can never
both be true.
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(3) a. # Prof. Procrastinate has to accept and write, but he doesn’t
have to accept.
b. # Prof. Procrastinate doesn’t have to accept, but he has to
accept and write.
Both (3a) and (3b) are unacceptable (as indicated by the ‘#’ preceding each
example). But this is unexpected if Inheritance fails: if (1a) is false and (1b)
is true, why can’t one conjoin them as in (3)? Indeed, the unacceptability of
these conjunctions appears to provide strong abductive support for Inheri-
tance. If Inheritance is valid then we have a straightforward explanation for
why these sentences sound bad: they can never be true.3
We argue that existing approaches to deontic modals fail to provide us with
a satisfactory resolution of the tension exhibited by (1) and (3). In short,
accounts which reject Inheritance have a hard time explaining why the con-
junctions in (3) are bad. And existing theories which validate Inheritance
don’t yield an adequate explanation for why (1a) sounds false in context.
In response, we develop a positive analysis of deontics. We will try to show
that our proposal does a better job of accounting for the intuitions elicited
by (1) and (3). In broad terms, our semantics validates Inheritance, and
therefore bears an affinity to standard, quantificational approaches. Conse-
quently, we are able to provide a straightforward explanation for why the
conjunctions in (3) are infelicitous. However, on our account Inheritance is
not valid tout court, or classically valid. Instead, it is only valid if we assume
that certain background conditions, or presuppositions are satisfied. And as
we will show, it is precisely the content and character of these presupposi-
tions which allow us to explain the contrast between (1a) and (1b).
The paper is structured as follows. In §2 we consider existing approaches to
deontics, and argue that they fail to provide an adequate explanation of our
observations. Then in §3 we develop our positive proposal in several stages.
Finally, §4 concludes.
2 Existing Accounts
In this section, we consider some of the most prominent existing analyses
of deontic modals. More specifically, in §2.1 we present two accounts on
which Inheritance is invalid, and in §2.2 we consider a popular theory which
3Some authors distinguish between “objective” and “subjective” senses of deontics such
as ‘ought’, e.g. Prichard (1932); Ross (1939); Jackson (1991, 1997). However exactly one
understands this distinction, we submit that analogues of (2) and (3) can be constructed
for each sense. So, our puzzle involving Inheritance doesn’t hang on any particular inter-
pretation of ‘ought’.
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validates Inheritance. We show that none of these accounts successfully
resolves the tension discussed in §1.
2.1 Actualism and decision-theoretic accounts
The most popular Inheritance-rejecting accounts are types of contrastivism
about deontic claims. Contrastivists maintain that sentences such as (1a)
(‘Prof. Procrastinate ought to accept’) have an implicitly comparative na-
ture. More precisely, contrastivism is the idea that (1a) is true just when
the proposition Procrastinate accepts is better than the relevant alternative
propositions. A central point of difference between contrastivists concerns
how the notion of “betterness” should be understood, i.e. what grounds the
comparison between propositions. We will briefly consider two varieties of
contrastivism: actualism and decision-theoretic accounts.4
Actualists spell out the comparison in terms of similarity to the actual world
(or more generally, the world of evaluation).5 They also take for granted
a preference ordering over possible worlds, so that it makes sense to talk
about one world being better than another. If we suppose that the only
alternative relevant for the evaluation of pought pq is ¬p, actualism can be
presented as follows:6
Actualist semantics for ought
pought pq is true in w iff the closest p-world to w is better than
the closest ¬p-world to w
By contrast, decision-theoretic accounts spell out the comparison in terms of
decision-theoretic notions such as expected value.7 The expected value of p is
the utility of p weighted by the relevant probabilities (Jeffrey, 1965).8 Again,
assuming that the only alternative relevant to the evaluation of pought pq
is ¬p, a simple decision-theoretic account can be presented as follows:
Decision-theoretic semantics for ought
pought pq is true in w iff the expected value of p in w is higher
than the expected value of ¬p in w
4Also see (Finlay, 2019) for a further contrastivist theory that rejects Inheritance.
5See, e.g. (Jackson, 1985; Jackson & Pargetter, 1986).
6We let ‘p’ range over the logical forms of proposition-denoting strings and let ‘p’ range
over the corresponding propositions denoted by ‘p’.
7See e.g. (Goble, 1996; Lassiter, 2017).
8Note that if there are many ways for an agent to act so that p obtains, then the
underlying probability distribution will have to assign probabilities to the acts themselves.
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It is fairly easy to see that both actualism and decision-theoretic accounts
can explain our first observation from §1. This concerned the fact that (1a)
sounds false, but (1b) sounds true in the Procrastinate scenario:
(1) a. Prof. Procrastinate ought to accept.
b. Prof. Procrastinate ought to accept and write.
Assuming that the closest world to actuality where Procrastinate accepts is
one where he fails to live up to his obligations, actualists predict that (1a)
should be false. By contrast, the closest world where Procrastinates accepts
and writes will be better than the closest world where he fails to accept
and write. So, actualists predict that (1b) should be true. Similarly, since
Procrastinate will likely not complete the review if he accepts, the expected
value of him accepting is very low. So, the decision-theoretic account pre-
dicts that (1a) should be false. On the other hand, the expected value of
Procrastinate accepting and writing is very high, so the decision-theoretic
account predicts that (1b) should be true.
However, as von Fintel (2012) points out, theories such as actualism and
the decision-theoretic account leave our second observation unexplained. If
(1a) is false and (1b) is true, it is completely mysterious why conjunctions
such as (3a) should sound so terrible:
(3a) # Prof. Procrastinate has to accept and write, but he doesn’t have
to accept.
The problem is quite general: it is difficult to see how any account that
makes (1a) false and (1b) true (in a single context) could explain why the
target conjunctions are abominable.9,10 This suggests to us that there is
9Actualists might argue that (3a) is predicted to be false on their account so long as the
improbable happens, and Procrastinate ends up accepting and writing. In this case, (1a)
will be true, assuming that the actual world is closest to itself. But in this scenario the
actualist also predicts that unacceptable speeches such as ‘Although we didn’t realize it
back then, it was true all along that Procrastinate ought to have accepted’ should be true.
Moreover, even if we know that Procrastinate won’t both accept and write (as in Jackson
& Pargetter’s original case), (3a) is infelicitous. However, granted plausible assumptions,
in this context the actualist predicts that (1a) is false and (1b) is true.
10In passing, von Fintel (2012) suggests that the Inheritance-denier might try to appeal
to (Moss, 2012) in order to explain what is going on with examples such as (3a). But there
is an immediate difficulty with this idea. Moss’s account is aimed at trying to explain
order effects arising from counterfactual conditionals, e.g. why (4) sounds fine but (5) is
infelicitous:
(4) If Mary goes to the concert, she’ll have fun, but if she goes to the concert and
is stuck behind a tall person, she won’t have fun.
(5) # If Mary goes to the concert and is stuck behind a tall person, she won’t have
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something not quite right with these approaches to deontic modals.11
Although we find actualism and decision-theoretic accounts problematic, it
is worth mentioning that we still think there is something fundamentally cor-
rect about the basic intuition underlying contrastivism, namely that deontic
claims are in some sense comparative by nature. But as we will see in §3,
our preferred way of implementing this idea is compatible with Inheritance,
and therefore predicts that examples such as (3a) should be unacceptable.12
2.2 Kratzer’s account
Accounts that validate Inheritance are by and large versions of the stan-
dard, Kratzerian analysis of modal expressions in natural language. On
this approach, modals operate as quantifiers over a usually restricted do-
main of possibilities. This domain is fixed by two parameters: (i) the modal
base, which determines the broad set of possibilities relevant for evaluat-
ing the modal, and (ii) the ordering source, which provides an ordering of
the possibilities in the modal base. On this view, different modal flavors
(e.g. epistemic, deliberative, deontic, bouletic, etc.) correspond to different
values of the two parameters.13
Kratzer’s approach makes use of a function best(·, ·) that takes a modal
base and an ordering and yields the set of top-ranked worlds as determined
by the ordering. We can simplify by restricting our attention to scenarios
where the modal base is finite. In this case, best can be spelled out as
follows:14
Specification of best
For any modal base B, and ordering >:
best(B, >) = {w′ ∈ B | ¬∃w′′ ∈ B such that w′′ > w′}
fun, but if she goes to the concert, she’ll have fun.
However, the abominable conjunctions that we are interested in don’t exhibit an order
effect; (3b) (‘Prof. Procrastinate doesn’t have to accept, but he has to accept and write)
sounds just as bad as (3a).
11Even Cariani (2021, 27), who himself rejects Inheritance, admits that ‘little has been
said by critics of Inheritance, myself included, to account for [examples such as (3a)] in a
systematic way’.
12For further criticisms of actualism and decision-theoretic accounts, see (Cariani,
2016a).
13See, e.g. (Kratzer, 1977, 1981, 1991, 2012).
14We only focus on finite cases for simplicity. There are well-known ways of formulating
best in order to cover cases where the ordering fails to contain maximal elements (Kratzer,
2012).
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Then Kratzer’s account of deontics is essentially the following:15
Kratzer’s semantics for ought
pought pq is true relative to 〈w,B, <〉 iff every w ∈ best(B, <)
is a p-world
This analysis makes Inheritance valid: if all of the best worlds are p-worlds,
and p entails q, then all the best worlds will be q-worlds as well. So, no mat-
ter what the modal base and ordering is, the conjunctions in (3) can never
be true. This provides a straightforward explanation for their infelicity.
But as it stands, the account can’t explain our first observation from §1.
Any context in which (1b) (‘Prof. Procrastinate ought to accept and write’)
is true will also be one in which (1a) (‘Prof. Procrastinate ought to accept’)
is true as well. Why, then, is the latter infelicitous? When discussing similar
cases, proponents of the Kratzerian analysis generally appeal to a context
shift here; they maintain that (1a) and (1b) are evaluated relative to distinct
parameters. For instance, von Fintel (2012) claims that the modal base
shifts. (1b) is evaluated relative to a modal base that includes worlds where
Procrastinate writes and accepts. Since such worlds are best, the sentence
is true. By contrast, (1a) is evaluated relative to a modal base that excludes
the possibilities in which Procrastinate accepts and writes, these worlds are
ignored in context. The best worlds in this restricted set are ones where the
professor declines, so (1a) is false.
Bronfman & Dowell (2018) also invoke context dependence, but locate it in
a different place. They maintain that (1a) and (1b) are evaluated relative to
distinct orderings. (1b) is evaluated relative to an ordering which only cares
about the overall goodness of the outcome, and thus ranks worlds in which
Procrastinate both accepts and writes as top. Relative to this ordering,
(1b) is true. On the other hand, (1a) is evaluated relative to an ordering on
which ‘a world w gets ranked on the basis of how well Procrastinate can be
expected to discharge his professional responsibilities, given the action he
performs in w during the time it would take him to accept’ (p.96). Relative
to this ordering, the best worlds are ones where Procrastinate declines, so
(1a) is false.
One might worry that these responses in defense of the Kratzerian analysis
undermine the account’s explanation of what goes wrong with abominable
conjunctions. If the parameters relative to which (1a) and (1b) are evaluated
15Strictly speaking, on Kratzer’s account deontic claims are evaluated relative to more
complex objects than just a set of worlds and an ordering. Working with these more
complex elements is important for some applications—see, e.g. (Cariani et al., 2013;
Cariani, 2016b). However, they aren’t necessary for our purposes, so we use a simpler
representation here.
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can shift, then why can’t both conjuncts in (3a) (‘Prof. Procrastinate has
to accept and write, but he doesn’t have to accept’) be true? Here the
Kratzerian can appeal to an independently motivated fact about context-
sensitivity: intersentential context shifts are often difficult to achieve. For
instance, consider “weather predicates” such as ‘raining’. The meaning of
these expressions can be modulated by explicit linguistic material, e.g. ‘It
as raining in London on June 1st, 1994’. But they can also be modulated by
contextually salient information, e.g. when I ask my friend in London ‘Is it
raining?’, I will naturally be understood as asking ‘Is it raining in London?’,
even if I am in New York City at the time of the call. However, even if both
my location and my friend’s have been made salient, it is very difficult to
interpret each occurrence of ‘raining’ in (6a) relative to distinct locations.
The sentence simply sounds incoherent. Indeed, even if we make one of the
locations explicit, as in (6b), it is still hard to recover a good interpretation
of the sentence.
(6) a. # It’s raining, but it’s not raining.
b. # It’s raining in London, but it’s not raining.
Similar observations can be made about other context-sensitive expressions,
for example quantifiers and gradable adjectives such as ‘tall’:
(7) a. # Everyone is asleep but someone is awake.
b. # Mark is tall but he is short.
It is usually assumed that the domains of quantifiers are fixed by context
(Stanley & Szabó, 2000), and that gradable adjectives are interpreted rel-
ative to a contextually determined scale, e.g. a scale of tallness (Kennedy,
2007). However, it is plausible that neither of these parameters are able to
shift in the examples in (7), which accounts for why they are infelicitous.
Indeed, there is independent evidence that the parameters relative to which
modals are interpreted cannot easily be shifted mid-sentence. For example,
consider epistemic modals such as ‘might’ and ‘must’:
(8) # Amy must be at work but she might be at home.
Presumably (8) is unacceptable because ‘might’ and ‘must’ are being eval-
uated relative to the same modal base; and relative to a single modal base
both conjuncts cannot be true together. Overall, there is compelling evi-
dence that mid-sentence context shifts are often difficult to achieve. So, it
is plausible that intersentential context shifts are difficult to bring about in
constructions such as (3a). If that’s correct, then appealing to a context shift
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in response to our observations in (1) doesn’t undermine the Kratzerian’s
account of abominable conjunctions.16
There are, however, problems with these appeals to context shifting. Let
us consider von Fintel’s response first. The Procrastinate story specifically
emphasizes that it is not impossible Procrastinate both accepts and writes,
just that this outcome is unlikely. But on the Kratzerian approach, the
modal base for ‘ought’ is taken to be circumstantial—that is, determined by
the relevant facts of the situation. There is some vagueness in what exactly
“relevant” means here, and how precisely circumstantial modal bases should
be specified. However, Procrastinate’s dispositions to accept and write seem
relevant on almost any plausible way of understanding this notion. So, by
the Kratzerian’s own lights, worlds in which Procrastinate accepts and writes
should appear in the modal base.
In response, it might be argued that low-probability outcomes are often ig-
nored for the purposes of semantic evaluation, and that this is what happens
when we assess (1a).17 But there being a low probability that Procrastinate
both accepts and writes isn’t necessary to get the relevant judgments going.
So long as the outcome where Procrastinate accepts and fails to write is
made bad enough, we can make it quite likely that Procrastinate accepts
and writes. Consider the following variant of the Procrastinate scenario:
Procrastinate 2 : Prof. Procrastinate is invited to review a book
on which he is the only fully qualified specialist on the planet.
Procrastinate is generally reliable, but sometimes fails to bring
16To be clear, intersentential context shifts are not always difficult to achieve. As
mentioned, it is usually assumed that the domains of quantifiers are determined by context.
In that case, examples such as Soames’s (1986) (9) involve a fairly seamless mid-sentence
context shift, since the domain for the quantifier ‘everyone’ obviously can’t be the same
as the domain for the indefinite description:
(9) Everyone is asleep and is being monitored by a research assistant.
This raises the following question: why are intersentential contexts shifts easy to achieve
in some cases, e.g. (9), but difficult to accomplish in others, e.g. (6a)-(8)? We are
not aware of a systematic theory that addresses this question. But given that there is
independent evidence that intersentential context shifts are hard to accomplish in many
cases, we don’t think it is particularly problematic to maintain that our target abominable
conjunctions are cases where each conjunct is, by default, interpreted relative to the same
contextual parameter. Indeed, it is especially striking that mid-sentence context shifts are
difficult to achieve with other modal expressions, e.g. epistemic modals. This provides
at least prima facie support for the claim that the contextually determined parameters
relative to which deontic modals are evaluated can’t be easily shifted either.
17It is plausible that something like this occurs when we evaluate conditionals. For
instance, the truth of ‘If I drop this plate, it’ll smash’ doesn’t seemed to be undermined
by worlds where some quantum event occurs so that the plate lands safely on the floor
without breaking (Lewis, 2016).
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projects to completion. In particular, if Procrastinate accepts to
review the book, it is quite likely (but not certain) that he will
end up writing the review. If Procrastinate accepts but doesn’t
end up writing the review, the consequences will be catastrophic:
his actions will precipitate a crisis in tertiary education that will
culminate in several universities closing and thousands of aca-
demics losing their livelihoods. If Procrastinate declines, some-
one less qualified than him will end up writing the review, but
there will be no crisis.
To our ears, the relevant pattern of judgments in Procrastinate is replicated
in Procrastinate 2. (1a) still sounds false, since the costs of Procrastinate
accepting and failing to write the review are enormous. On the other hand,
(1b) still sounds true. If that’s right, then ignoring the outcome where
Procrastinate accepts and writes on the grounds that it is low probability
isn’t an adequate response to the phenomenon.
Turning to Bronfman & Dowell’s reply, recall that they do not appeal to a
shift in the modal base. Instead, they appeal to a shift in the ordering that is
relevant in context. The claim is that (1a) is false on the ordering relative to
which it is evaluated, since all of the best worlds are ones where Procrastinate
declines. But this makes bad predictions. It implies that sentences such as
(10a) and (10b) should have true interpretations in context:
(10) a. Prof. Procrastinate ought to/has to not accept and write.
b. Prof. Procrastinate ought to/has to do something other than
accept and write.
However, it is very difficult to hear these as true in the Procrastinate sce-
nario.18,19
18The Procrastinate 2 scenario also poses a problem for Bronfman & Dowell. Recall that
on their account the ordering relative to which (1a) is evaluated is one where ‘a world w gets
ranked on the basis of how well Procrastinate can be expected to discharge his professional
responsibilities, given the action he performs in w during the time it would take him to
accept’. However, in Procrastinate 2 Procrastinate can be expected to discharge his
professional responsibilities, given that he accepts. So, on both of the orderings that
Bronfman & Dowell appeal to, the best worlds are ones where Procrastinate accepts and
writes. That said, we agree with Bronfman & Dowell that the unacceptability of (1a) is
partly determined by certain temporal considerations—see §3.3 for further discussion.
19Von Fintel also maintains that any context where (1a) is unacceptable is one where
all of the best worlds in the relevant modal base are decline-worlds. However, on his
approach every world in this modal base is one where Procrastinate fails to both accept
and write. This is relevant because proponents of the Kratzerian analysis often impose
the following constraint on certain modal claims: ppq is true with respect to a modal
base B only if B contains both p-worlds and ¬p-worlds, i.e. p is diverse with respect to
B (Condoravdi, 2002). On von Fintel’s approach, the examples in (10) fail the diversity
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We should say that although von Fintel and Bronfman & Dowell’s attempt
to explain the badness of (1a) (‘Prof. Procrastinate ought to accept’) is
problematic, we still think that appealing to a context-shift here is essentially
correct. As we will see, what distinguishes our approach from the previously
mentioned authors is the parameter associated with the shift.
To sum up, existing theories of deontic modals have competing strengths:
views that reject Inheritance can explain why (1a) sounds false and (1b)
(‘Prof. Procrastinate ought to accept and write’) sounds true, but they
can’t explain why conjunctions such as (3a) (‘Prof. Procrastinate has to
accept and write, but he doesn’t have to accept’) are abominable. On the
other hand, views that validate Inheritance can explain why the relevant
conjunctions are abominable, but they can’t provide a satisfying explanation
for why (1a) sounds false. In the next section, we develop a positive proposal
which, we argue, yields a more promising account of our observations.
3 A semantics for ought
We develop our theory in several stages. First, we present our basic entry
for ‘ought’ in §3.1, which allows us to explain why conjunctions such as (3a)
are unacceptable. Then in §§3.2-3.3 we add presuppositions to our account,
and discuss some important meta-semantic considerations. Our discussion
in these subsections allows us to explain the contrast between (1a) and (1b).
Finally, in §3.4 we contrast our approach with those of Cariani (2013, 2016b).
3.1 The basic proposal
Like Kratzer’s account considered in §2.2, we also propose that ‘ought’ op-
erates as a quantifier over a restricted domain of possibilities. However, one
of the key features of our account is that we take the objects in this domain
to be propositions rather than worlds. There are several ways of developing
this idea, but we will implement it in a fairly simple way so as not to distract
from our central arguments.
We will say thatA is a set of alternatives if it is a set of pairwise incompatible
propositions. So, if A,B ∈ A, then A∩B = ∅. To illustrate, let ann, mary,
pete, and sue represent the propositions that Ann wins the race, Mary
wins the race, Pete wins the race, and Sue wins the race, respectively. Then
A1 = {ann, mary, pete, sue} is a set of alternatives. We propose that the
condition relative to the modal base where (1a) is unacceptable. On the other hand, it is
worth noting that positing a diversity condition for deontic modals is fairly controversial
(Frank, 1997; Zvolensky, 2002).
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set of objects that is relevant for the evaluation of an ‘ought’ claim is a set
of contextually supplied alternatives.
We also propose that ‘ought’ claims are evaluated relative to a contextually
determined ordering  over propositions. The function top(·, ·) takes a set
of alternatives A and ordering , and returns the maximal elements in the
ordering.20 For instance, suppose  orders A1 as follows:
ann  mary  pete  sue
Then top(A1,) = ann.21
Our first-run account can be expressed as follows:
Account 1
pought pq is true relative to 〈w,A,〉 iff for every q ∈ top(A,):
q ⊆ p
In short, pought pq is true just in case all of the top-ranked alternatives
in the ordering entail p. To be clear, we aren’t the first to propose an
alternative-sensitive entry along the lines of Account 1 (Cariani, 2013; Car-
iani et al., 2013; Cariani, 2016b). But we will develop this approach in a
novel direction.22
To get a feel for how Account 1 works, consider the following famous example
from Parfit (1988):23
Miners: Ten miners are trapped either in shaft A or in shaft B,
but we do not know which. Flood waters threaten to flood the
shafts. We have enough sandbags to block one shaft, but not
both. If we block one shaft, all the water will go into the other
shaft, killing any miners inside it. If we block neither shaft, both
shafts will fill halfway with water, and just one miner, the lowest
in the shaft, will be killed.
(11) We ought to block neither shaft.
(11) has a salient true reading here, but this can’t be captured by the stan-
dard Kratzerian analysis (Cariani et al., 2013). This is because blocking
20For simplicity we assume that A has finite cardinality.
21As a shorthand, we will write top(A1,) = ann when we mean top(A1,) = {ann}.
22See §3.4 for a comparison between our approach and (Cariani, 2013, 2016b).
23Parfit credits Regan (1980) with the case. Also see (Kolodny & MacFarlane, 2010)
for discussion.
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neither shaft is guaranteed to lead to a suboptimal outcome; the best worlds
are ones where we block shaft A and the miners are in A, or we block shaft B
and the miners are in B. However, alternatives are relatively coarse-grained
entities. So, even if there are some worlds in an alternative B that are
suboptimal, B can still be ranked higher than the other alternatives. For
instance, let us suppose that the relevant set of alternatives in the Miners
scenario is A = {neither,a,b}, where neither is the proposition that we
block neither shaft, a is the proposition that we block shaft A, and b is
the proposition that we block shaft B. Moreover, let us suppose that the
relevant ordering over these alternatives looks as follows:
neither  a/b
In this case, Account 1 predicts that (11) should be true.
At this point, two natural meta-semantic questions arise for Account 1: (i)
how exactly does the set of alternatives A get determined in context, and
(ii) how is the ordering over alternatives  structured. We will have more
to say about (i) in §3.3. But to a first approximation, the alternatives rele-
vant for the evaluation of an ‘ought’ claim are tied to the actions that the
relevant agent(s) can perform, their decision problem. Importantly, deci-
sion problems become more fine-grained over time, as the space of possible
actions available to the agent increases. For instance, in the Procrastinate
scenario, Prof. Procrastinate’s immediate options involve deciding between
accepting and declining. Let us call the set of alternatives corresponding to
this decision problem coarse, so coarse = {accept,decline}. But rela-
tive to a longer time-frame, more actions become available to Procrastinate.
In particular, he has two ways of acting once he’s accepted: he can either
accept and write, or accept and not write. Let us call the set of alternatives
corresponding to this more fine-grained decision problem fine, so fine =
{accept&write,accept&write,decline}. It is our general contention
that there are two relevant sets of alternatives in the Procrastinate scenario:
coarse and fine.
As for (ii), we’re attracted to the idea that in the relevant contexts, e.g. Pro-
crastinate, the ordering over alternatives is determined by decision-theoretic
considerations, e.g. expected value. In that case, for alternatives A,B:
A  B when the expected value of A is greater than the expected value
of B. This would explain why, for example, neither is top-ranked in the
Miners example. It also means that decline will be top-ranked relative to
coarse, but that accept&write will be top-ranked relative to fine.24
24To be clear, we have only suggested that alternatives are ordered by expected value
because this idea is fairly simple, yields intuitive verdicts for the range of cases we consider,
and allows us to provide a concrete implementation of our general framework. Officially,
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Just like Kratzer’s analysis, Account 1 makes Inheritance valid: if all of
the best alternatives entail p, and p entails q, then all the best alternatives
will entail q as well. So, no matter what the set of alternatives and order-
ing is, conjunctions such as (3a) (‘Prof. Procrastinate has to accept and
write, but he doesn’t have to accept’) can never be true. This provides a
straightforward explanation for their infelicity.
But Account 1 doesn’t yet explain the contrast between (1a) and (1b); why
the former sounds false in the Procrastinate scenario, but the latter sounds
true:
(1) a. Prof. Procrastinate ought to accept.
b. Prof. Procrastinate ought to accept and write.
We have claimed that there are two relevant sets of alternatives in the Pro-
crastinate scenario: coarse and fine. Given a decision-theoretic ordering,
(1a) is false relative to coarse, and (1b) is true relative to fine. However,
the problem is that (1a) is true relative to fine, and (1b) is false relative
to coarse (since accept doesn’t entail Procrastinate accepts and writes).
So, what needs to be explained is why (1a) tends to be evaluated relative to
coarse, but (1b) is evaluated relative to fine. We try to do this in the next
two subsections.
3.2 Representation
Let us begin by considering why (1b) is evaluated relative to fine rather than
coarse. The basic idea is that ‘ought’ claims carry certain presuppositions
which force (1b) to be evaluated relative to the more fine-grained set of
alternatives. We spell this out below.
Recall that coarse = {accept,decline}. The complement in (1b) ex-
presses the following proposition: Procrastinate writes and accepts. Intu-
itively, there is a mismatch here between this proposition and the distinctions
made salient by coarse. More precisely, Procrastinate writes and accepts is
all we are committed to is that in the contexts of interest, the ordering over alternatives
has a decision-theoretic aspect which allows us to distinguish between the alternatives.
We want to leave it open whether the ordering is always determined by decision-theoretic
considerations. For instance, the so-called “objective” sense of ‘ought’ might call for
a ranking that departs from notions such as expected value. (See (Cariani, 2016b) for
relevant discussion.) Moreover, we want to leave it open that in the cases of interest,
the “good news value” of an alternative is better represented by using expected value in
more sophisticated ways, or even by adopting a more sophisticated decision theory, e.g.
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1988) or risk-weighted utility theory (Buchak,
2013). Finally, we note that the background information state used to formulate the
relevant decision-theoretic notion shouldn’t necessarily be taken to be the agent’s beliefs
or credences. For example, see the game show cases in §3.3.
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too specific, it cuts logical space finer than coarse allows. The thought is
that this sort of disconnect between the prejacent of an ‘ought’ claim and the
background set of alternatives should be ruled out. We can make this more
precise through the following definition. Given a set of alternatives A and
proposition p, let us say that p is represented by A just in case every alterna-
tive in A either entails p or entails ¬p.25 For instance, the proposition that
Procrastinate accepts is represented by coarse, but the proposition that he
accepts and writes is not, since accept neither entails this proposition nor
its negation.
We propose adding a representation requirement to the semantics of ‘ought’
claims. One option is to add it as a regular truth condition. However, then
a sentence such as (12) will be true relative to coarse:
(12) # Prof. Procrastinate doesn’t have to write the book review.
This is because decline doesn’t entail Procrastinate writes the review. How-
ever, it is difficult to hear this sentence as acceptable.26
Instead, we suggest capturing the representation requirement as a presup-
position, or definedness condition on ‘ought’ claims. Our final entry then
looks as follows:
Semantics for ought
pought pq is defined relative to 〈w,A,〉 only if p is represented
by A
If defined, pought pq is true relative to 〈w,A,〉 iff for every
q ∈ top(A,): q ⊆ p
(12) is not predicted to be true on our account, since presuppositions
project through negation (Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet, 2000). So, (12)
is predicted to suffer from presupposition failure when evaluated relative to
coarse.27
25Cf. Cariani’s (2013) notion of a proposition being “visible” with respect to a back-
ground partition of logical space. See §3.4 for further discussion of Cariani’s account.
26Indeed, (12) seems bad even when it is uttered on the heels of a sentence that is
plausibly evaluated relative to coarse, as in (13):
(13) # Prof. Procrastinate doesn’t have to accept, and he doesn’t have to write the
book review.
27For convenience, we assume that presupposition failure has a semantic effect. But
our general approach is compatible with pragmatic accounts of presupposition on which
presupposition failure affects assertability rather than semantic value (Schlenker, 2009).
In this setting, there is every prospect for maintaining that Inheritance is classically valid
(cf. the discussion immediately below).
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Note that on this semantics, it is still the case that configurations of the
form pought p but not ought qq, where p entails q, can never be true. This
is because although our account doesn’t make Inheritance classically valid,
it is still Strawson valid (von Fintel, 1999). Essentially, an argument from a
set of sentences Γ to a sentence ψ is Strawson valid just in case whenever all
of the ϕ ∈ Γ and ψ are defined, if all of the ϕ ∈ Γ are true, then ψ must be
true as well.28 So, sentences of the form pought p but not ought qq, where
p entails q, will always either be false or undefined.29
Now, it is generally accepted that hearers tend to interpret sentences so as
to avoid presupposition failure. That is, within reasonable limits, hearers
will make the assumptions necessary to avoid undefinedness.30 For instance,
even if I suspect that you have no siblings, I will come to assume that you
have a sister once I’ve heard you utter (14):
(14) I have to fetch my sister from the airport tomorrow.
That is, the presupposition triggered by the possessive ‘my sister’, namely
that I have a sister, is taken to hold when evaluating (14).
We want to suggest that something similar happens when we interpret (1b)
(‘Prof. Procrastinate ought to accept and write’) in context. To repeat,
there are two relevant sets of alternatives in the Procrastinate scenario,
namely coarse and fine. We have seen that (1b) fails to be defined rela-
tive to coarse, since the proposition Procrastinate accepts and writes isn’t
represented by this set of alternatives. But (1b) is defined relative to fine.
Assuming that hearers will try to avoid interpretations that result in pre-
supposition failure, they will then be moved to evaluate (1b) relative to fine
rather than coarse. This is exactly the result that we wanted.
Note that the drive to avoid presupposition failure still doesn’t clarify why
(1a) should be evaluated relative to coarse, since this sentence is defined
28Strawson validity has been used to account for a range of natural language phenomena,
e.g., see (von Fintel, 1999; Cariani & Goldstein, 2018; Mandelkern, 2020). That said, one
can raise questions about how exactly the notion of Strawson validity bears on intuitions
about natural language inferences. For instance, Strawson entailment fails to be transitive
(Dorr & Hawthorne, 2018). We’re sympathetic to these concerns, but we don’t think that
they should trouble us here. Most importantly, our use of Strawson validity is fairly
constrained, since we’re essentially only interested in entailments from a single sentence
schema.
29To be clear, the infelicity of examples such as (3a) (‘Prof. Procrastinate has to accept
and write, but he doesn’t have to accept’) doesn’t simply follow from the claim that they
are Strawson contradictions on a uniform interpretation. Rather, their infelicity follows
from that fact in combination with the claim that mid-sentence contexts shifts in these
sentences are difficult to achieve (see the discussion of context shifting in §2.2).
30This process is usually discussed under the heading “accommodation”. The basic
phenomenon goes back at least to Kartunnen (1974). See (von Fintel, 2004) for a more
recent discussion.
16
relative to fine as well. Further arguments must be proffered in order to
account for this asymmetry. We turn to these next.
3.3 Alternatives and immediate control
We want to start by getting clearer about the data surrounding examples
such (1a), and what precisely needs to be explained. We have already seen
that this sentence is unacceptable when uttered in the original Procrastinate
scenario. But it is important to observe that the example improves when
uttered in conjunction with (1b). For instance, consider the following:
(15) a. Prof. Procrastinate ought to accept and write, so he ought to
accept.
b. Prof. Procrastinate ought to accept, since he ought to accept
and write.
These seem basically fine to us, and certainly much better than (1a) uttered
on its own. Also consider a variant of the Procrastinate scenario where your
friend Pete is completely ignorant of the goodness/badness of Procrastinate’s
possible actions:
(16) a. Pete: I know that Procrastinate can decline, accept and not
write, or accept and write. What should he do?
b. You: He ought to accept, because accepting and writing is best.
Again, we don’t find it difficult to hear your reply in (16b) as true. What
the above examples show is that (1a) isn’t always unacceptable, and can be
felicitous when uttered in the right setting. So, what needs to be explained
is why (i) (1a) sounds bad when uttered in the most natural reconstruc-
tions of the Procrastinate scenario, but (ii) (1a) improves when uttered in
configurations such as (15) and (16b).31
In §3.1 we proposed that the alternatives relevant for the evaluation of an
‘ought’ claim are tied to the actions that the relevant agent(s) can perform,
their decision problem. We also mentioned that decision problems become
more fine-grained over time, as the space of possible actions available to the
agent increases. In order to account for (i), we suggest that the relevant
alternatives tend to reflect what is in the agent’s immediate control. That
31Note that the examples in (15) and (16b) pose a further problem for Inheritance-
rejecting theories such as those considered in §2.1. For if (1a) is false in context, why
should this sentence become more acceptable when uttered in conjunction with (1b)? It’s
unclear.
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is, the alternatives used to evaluate a deontic claim are, ceteris paribus, de-
rived from the agent’s immediate courses of action, their short-term decision
problem. If that’s correct, then we should expect that (1a) will, by default,
be interpreted relative to coarse rather than fine, since Procrastinate’s im-
mediate options are simply accepting and declining. And as we’ve seen, (1a)
is false relative to coarse, which would explain its infelicity.
That the operative alternatives tend to align with what is in an agent’s
immediate control can be supported by reflecting on the general point and
purpose of uttering deontically modalized claims. These claims are often
uttered with an eye to advising agents of their best course of action, and
aiding them in the the process of deliberation. For computational reasons, it
is prudent for those who are providing advice to focus on the earlier branches
of the agent’s decision tree. The number of possible actions available to an
agent grows large over time, and if presented with a complete course of action
that spans the entire tree, it is easy for agents to become overwhelmed.
Think about providing directions to a tourist: in order to maximize the
chances of uptake, it is best to disclose the directional information in a step-
by-step fashion; the tourist could easily become bewildered if presented with
a complete route to their destination all in one go. Another point in this
vicinity involves motivation: it is plausible that agents tend to be more
motivated to finish complex tasks if they are broken down into smaller,
discrete actions.32 If that’s right, then it would make sense for deontic claims
to be evaluated relative to a comparatively short-term temporal horizon.
There are also empirical reasons to think that alternatives tend to reflect
what is in the agent’s immediate control. Indeed, to our minds one of the
strongest considerations in favor of this idea is that it makes the following
prediction: it predicts that if we started to alter cases such as Procrastinate
so that all of the actions available to the agent could be carried out at a single
point in time, examples such as (1a) should start to sound more acceptable.
It is difficult to test this in the actual Procrastinate case without the example
becoming fairly contrived. But consider the following scenario:
Diachronic Treaty : You are a high government official for the
country of Arun. Arun’s diplomats have negotiated treaties
with Arun’s neighbors Bethesda and Carmill. Carmill is much
stronger than Bethesda. Signing treaties with both neighbors
would bring great wealth and prosperity to Arun, while signing
with neither will have no effect. Signing a treaty with Bethesda
but not Carmill will inevitably lead to war with Carmill, and the
eventual ruin of Arun. Today you must choose whether to sign
32This psychological tendency is reflected in the following well-known question and
answer pair: How do you eat an elephant? One bite at a time!
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a treaty with Bethesda. Tomorrow you must choose whether to
sign a treaty with Carmill. You find Carmill’s king unbearable,
and detest facilitating the development of his kingdom. So, even
if you sign with Bethesda today, there’s a decent chance that you
will not be able to bring yourself to sign with Carmill tomorrow.
(17) You ought to sign the treaty with Bethesda.
Our judgment is that (17) patterns with (1a): (17) is infelicitous in context.
But now consider the following variant of the case:
Synchronic Treaty : As in Diachronic Treaty, but now the de-
cision to sign with Bethesda and Carmill is made at the same
time. Depending on which of four buttons you press, your elec-
tronic signature will be placed on both treaties, exactly one of
the treaties, or none of them.
(18) You ought to sign the treaty with Bethesda.
To our ears, and those of our informants, (18) improves considerably here.
Indeed, the sentence just sounds true. This is neatly accounted for by the
idea that alternatives are “chunked” with respect to what is in an agent’s
immediate control. In Diachronic Treaty, your short-term decision prob-
lem involves whether or not to sign with Bethesda. Relative to this set
of alternatives, (17) is false, since not signing with Bethesda has a higher
expected value than signing. But in Synchronic Treaty, your short-term de-
cision problem involves every configuration of accepting and declining treaty
agreements. Relative to this set of alternatives, (18) is true, since signing
with both Bethesda and Carmill has highest expected value.
Here is another example to a similar effect:
Diachronic Game Show : Alex is on a game show. He has to
push two buttons consecutively, with a minute pause between
pushes. He has a choice of the red button or the blue button
for his first push, and a choice of the white button or the black
button for his second push. If Alex pushes the red button first,
he’ll get $1000 regardless which button he pushes after. If he
pushes the blue button first, he’ll either get $1100 if he pushes
the black button second, or $0 if he pushes the white button
second. Alex is entirely ignorant of the payoffs associated with
the button pushes.
(19) Alex ought to push the blue button first.
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Again, (19) patterns with (1a): (19) is infelicitous in context. But now
consider the following variant of the case:
Synchronic Game Show : Alex is on a game show. He has to push
two buttons at the same time: one with his left hand and one
with his right hand. He has a choice of the red button or the blue
button for his left hand push, and a choice of the white button or
the black button for his right hand push. If Alex pushes the red
button with his left hand, he’ll get $1000 regardless which button
he pushes with his right hand. If he pushes the blue button with
his left hand, he’ll either get $1100 if he pushes the black button
with his right hand, or $0 if he pushes the white button with his
right hand. Alex is entirely ignorant of the payoffs associated
with the button pushes.
(20) Alex ought to push the blue button with his left hand.
(20) sounds true here. Again, this can be explained if we assume that alter-
natives tend to reflect what is in an agent’s immediate control. In Diachronic
Game Show, Alex’s short-term decision problem involves whether to push
the red button or the blue button. Relative to this set of alternatives, (19) is
false, since pushing the red button has a higher expected value than pushing
the blue button. But in Synchronic Game Show, Alex’s short-term decision
problem involves pushing every button configuration. Relative to this set
of alternatives, (20) is true, since pushing blue-black has highest expected
value.
Further support for a connection between the operative alternatives and
what is in an agent’s control comes from the Miners case presented in §3.1:
Miners: Ten miners are trapped either in shaft A or in shaft B,
but we do not know which. Flood waters threaten to flood the
shafts. We have enough sandbags to block one shaft, but not
both. If we block one shaft, all the water will go into the other
shaft, killing any miners inside it. If we block neither shaft, both
shafts will fill halfway with water, and just one miner, the lowest
in the shaft, will be killed.
(11) We ought to block neither shaft.
As we observed, (11) is naturally heard as true here. This can be explained
if we suppose that it is evaluated relative to the set A1 = {neither,a,b},
since neither has higher expected value than the other alternatives. But
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consider the set of alternatives A2 = {neither, i, i}, where i is the proposi-
tion that we block the shaft the miners are in, and i is the proposition that
we block shaft the miners aren’t in. Clearly, i has highest expected value
among these alternatives. So, if (11) was evaluated relative to A2, then
the sentence would be false. Why isn’t (11) evaluated relative to something
like A2? We suggest that this is because A2 doesn’t reflect what’s in our
control. We can’t choose whether or not to block the shaft which contains
the miners, since we don’t know which shaft they’re in. To be clear, this
is not to say that sets such as A2 are never relevant for evaluating deontic
claims in Miners. For instance, it is easy to hear (21) as true:
(21) We ought to block the shaft that the miners are in.
This claim won’t be defined relative to A1. So, for reasons given in §3.2,
(21) will tend to be evaluated relative to something like A2.33
As for (ii), we have been careful to frame the preference for short-term
decision problems as a default, rather than a rigid rule. So, we predict that
it could be overridden in the right circumstances, e.g. in order to avoid
presupposition failure. Given our assumption that coarse and fine are the
relevant sets of alternatives in the Procrastinate scenario, we then have a
fairly straightforward explanation for why ‘Procrastinate ought to accept’
sounds fine in, e.g. (15a) (‘Prof. Procrastinate ought to accept and write,
so he ought to accept’). We have seen that the accept-and-write conjunct
is undefined relative to coarse. So, in order to ensure that this conjunct is
defined, hearers will evaluate these conjunctions relative to fine. But (1a)
is true relative to fine.34
33Some might worry that our explanation for why (1a) is unacceptable contravenes a
compelling principle involving speaker interpretation: when possible, hearers will interpret
utterances to be true. Given this principle, our explanation might seem surprising, since
hearers are able to evaluate (1a) relative to a set of alternatives on which it comes out
true, namely fine. However, care must be taken when applying interpretation principles
such as these. The psycholinguistics literature is replete with examples where on the face
of it hearers should easily be able to access true interpretations, and yet fail to do so. For
instance, consider pronoun resolution (Kehler & Rohde, 2013):
(22) Norm lent his car to his brother’s girlfriend. He doesn’t own one.
Subjects tend to judge (22) to be false, and question how it is that Norm could both lend
a car and fail to own one. But one might antecedently have expected that ‘he’ could easily
be resolved to Norm’s brother’s girlfriend, which could have led to a true interpretation.
34A reviewer wonders why presupposition accommodation does not induce a mid-
sentence context shift in (3b) (‘Prof. Procrastinate doesn’t have to accept, but he has
to accept and write’) so that the first conjunct is evaluated relative to coarse and the
second conjunct is evaluated relative to fine, in which case the conjunction would be true.
The reviewer motivates this possibility by considering examples such as (23) (styled after
(Lewis, 1979)):
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Note that our account of why (1a) is unacceptable, but (1b) is acceptable,
is similar to the explanations given by von Fintel and Bronfman & Dowell
discussed in §2.2, since it also involves appealing to a context shift. However,
there are important differences. For one thing, we suggested that the most
plausible way of developing von Fintel’s response predicts that (1a) should
be acceptable in the following variant of the Procrastinate scenario (repeated
from above):
Procrastinate 2 : Prof. Procrastinate is invited to review a book
on which he is the only fully qualified specialist on the planet.
Procrastinate is generally reliable, but sometimes fails to bring
projects to completion. In particular, if Procrastinate accepts to
review the book, it is quite likely (but not certain) that he will
end up writing the review. If Procrastinate accepts but doesn’t
end up writing the review, the consequences will be catastrophic:
his actions will precipitate a crisis in tertiary education that will
culminate in several universities closing and thousands of aca-
demics losing their livelihoods. If Procrastinate declines, some-
one less qualified than him will end up writing the review, but
there will be no crisis.
But (1a) still sounds false here, since the costs of Procrastinate accepting
and failing to write the review are enormous. This is what we predict, since
(23) The dog bit the other dog.
The idea is that the presupposition carried by the definite ‘the other dog’ triggers domain
expansion, ultimately yielding a coherent interpretation. However, we are doubtful that
the pressure to accommodate presuppositions can alone induce intersentential context
shifts. For instance, in (23) the adjective ‘other’ is crucial for inducing the shift here. For
observe that it is much harder to access a good reading of (24):
(24) ?? The dog bit the dog.
In fact, it is striking that even with contextual clues, e.g. if we successively pointed at
each dog, (24) still sounds bad. A further example in this vein involves possessives:
(25) ?? Bill’s dog bit Bill’s dog.
Even if we thought that Bill had at least two dogs, (25) would still be infelicitous. Or
consider (26):
(26) # There are no dogs but the dog is happy.
Clearly, the pressure to accommodate the presupposition triggered by the definite isn’t
sufficient to achieve domain expansion. Similar examples can be constructed using different
presupposition triggers, e.g. ‘both dogs’. In short, expressions such as ‘other’ play an
essential role in inducing the context shift in (23). But there are no expressions similar to
‘other’ that feature in (3b) which could facilitate a context shift through presupposition
accommodation.
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Procrastinate’s short-term decision problem still just involves accepting or
declining. And given the high costs of him accepting and not writing, de-
clining has high expected value.
As for Bronfman & Dowell, they predict that the examples in (10) should
have true readings:35
(10) a. Prof. Procrastinate ought to/has to not accept and write.
b. Prof. Procrastinate ought to/has to do something other than
accept and write.
By contrast, we predict that these examples will fail to be true on either
coarse or fine. For instance, relative to coarse, (10a) will be undefined,
since the proposition Procrastinate doesn’t accept and write isn’t represented
by this set of alternatives. And relative to fine, the sentence will be false,
since accepting and writing is the top-ranked alternative.
To sum up, we have proposed an account of ‘ought’ claims which patterns
broadly with Kratzer’s analysis: ‘ought’ operates as a quantifier over a re-
stricted domain of possibilities. However, on our account the objects in
this domain are propositions, or alternatives, rather than worlds. Moreover,
‘ought’ triggers presuppositions which impose constraints on the relationship
between the prejacent and the background set of alternatives. In combina-
tion with auxiliary principles governing the choice of alternatives in context,
we argued that our proposal resolves the tension involving Inheritance that
we set out to explain.36
35Bronfman & Dowell also predict that ‘We ought not block the shaft the miners are
in’ has a true interpretation in the Miners scenario. But as with the examples in (10), it
is very challenging to hear this sentence as good.
36A reviewer discusses the following case, where you are deciding what to do with some
leftovers. You can eat the leftovers now, or you can eat them tomorrow. There is also
a very small chance that you forget about the food and let it rot in the fridge. Suppose
that you aren’t very hungry now, so it would be a little bit better to eat the leftovers
tomorrow. The reviewer maintains that one can set up the utilities and probabilities in
this case so that our account predicts that (27) should be true relative to {now,now},
where now is the proposition that you eat the food now, and now is the proposition that
you don’t eat the food now.
(27) You ought to eat the leftovers now.
The reviewer argues that this is the wrong prediction, since (27) is unequivocally false
in this context.
In response, we think that the reviewer’s case is rather underdescribed as stated. And
when one fills in the details, we think that our account makes the correct predictions. Let
us suppose that the probability of you forgetting about the leftovers conditional on you
not eating them now is 1
1000
. It is helpful to assign utilities to the outcomes in line with the
reviewer’s description of the case: let us say that EV(eat now) = 10, and EV(wait and eat
tomorrow) = 12 (we make the difference in utilities small because this is what the reviewer
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We end this section by comparing our account to the theories of Cariani
(2013, 2016b).
3.4 Cariani (2013, 2016b)
We aren’t the first to marry a Kratzer-style entry with alternative-sensitivity.
In particular, Cariani develops two distinct proposals that are broadly in this
vein. We briefly consider these approaches here. In short, neither (Cariani,
2013) nor (Cariani, 2016b) provides an adequate response to our target
observations, but one could develop (Cariani, 2016b) so that the resulting
account is similar to our own.
Cariani (2013) also maintains that ‘ought’ quantifies over a domain of al-
ternatives, and he also imposes a representation requirement. However, his
account differs from our own in two respects: (i) the representation condition
is captured as a regular truth-condition, rather than a presupposition; and
(ii) Cariani posits a “benchmark element” in the contextually determined
ordering , and requires that pought pq is true only if every p-entailing al-
ternative is at least as good as this benchmark. Cariani’s account is roughly
the following:
stipulated). Then in order for EV(eat now) > EV(don’t eat now), EV(let leftovers rot)
< 1000.(10− 12. 999
1000
) = -1988. In other words, the outcome of letting the leftovers rot in
the fridge has to be very bad in order for EV(eat now) > EV(don’t eat now) given our
background assumptions. But it is plausible that in most normal circumstances, letting
the food rot wouldn’t be so bad. For instance, you will still have enough money to buy
other food, so you won’t starve. Thus, in most normal circumstances, EV(let leftovers
rot) ≥ -1988. In that case, our account predicts that (27) should be false.
Now suppose that the circumstances aren’t normal. In what sorts of scenarios would
EV(let leftovers rot) be so low, i.e. smaller than -1988? One possible scenario is the
following: suppose that the leftovers will produce a noxious, undetectable gas after two
days of being left in the fridge, and the gas will cause all the other food in the fridge
to go bad, causing hundreds of dollars of spoilage. In this context, our account predicts
that (27) should be true. To our minds, this is the correct prediction. Even though you
aren’t particularly hungry, it is reasonable to eat the leftovers now rather than risk, e.g.
the entire fridge being spoiled by not eating them now. Indeed, this choice is reflected
in judgments involving relative betterness: a sentence such as ‘It is better to eat the
leftovers now rather than risk an entire fridge full of spoiled food by not eating them now’
seems true in this scenario. Another way of putting the point is that this variant of the
case essentially becomes a version of the Procrastinate scenario: even if it is likely that
Procrastinate remembers to write the review, and even if accepting and writing is only
a little bit better than declining, it is easy to hear ‘Procrastinate ought not accept’ as
true if Procrastinate accepting but not writing would be catastrophic, e.g. if it would
precipitate a crisis in tertiary education that will culminate in several universities closing
and thousands of academics losing their livelihoods. (The Procrastinate 2 scenario from
§2.2 also illustrates that the event of Procrastinate writing being unlikely is inessential
to getting the relevant pattern of judgments going.) In short, when the reviewer’s case
is made more specific, and utilities are clearly assigned, our account appears to make the
correct predictions.
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Cariani’s (2013) semantics for ought
pought pq is true relative to 〈w,A,〉 iff
(i) for every q ∈ top(A,): q ⊆ p; and
(ii) for every q ∈ A such that q ⊆ p, q  the benchmark; and
(iii) p is represented by A
Granted plausible assumptions, this account predicts that (1a) (‘Prof. Pro-
crastinate ought to accept’) should be false, and (1b) (‘Prof. Procrastinate’)
should be true. For instance, suppose that the relevant set of alternatives is
fine, and the ordering looks as follows:
accept&write  decline  benchmark  accept&write
Then clearly (1b) will be true, but (1a) will be false since accept&write
entails that Procrastinate accepts, but it is below the benchmark.
However, the truth-conditions this account generates are much too strong.
For instance, suppose that you are choosing between beef, chicken, prawns,
and tofu. You like the beef and the tofu, but we come to learn that both
the chicken and the prawns are poisoned.
(28) You ought not order the chicken, and you ought not order the prawns.
(28) is impeccable here. But Cariani’s account predicts that it is false on the
most natural set of alternatives, i.e. A = {beef,chicken,prawns,tofu}.
Presumably, the ordering over these alternatives looks as follows, with both
chicken and prawns below the benchmark:
beef/tofu  benchmark  chicken/prawns
Then the first conjunct in (28) will be false, since prawns entails ¬You
order chicken, but it is below the benchmark. One might try to maintain
that the first conjunct of (28) is evaluated relative to a more coarse-grained
set of alternatives on which it comes out true, e.g. {chicken,chicken}.
But then assuming that mid-sentence context shifts are difficult to achieve,
the second conjunct in (28) will be false.37,38
37This response also predicts that an utterance of (28) should degrade when each of the
four meal alternatives are made salient prior to the utterance. But this doesn’t seem to
be the case.
38Examples such as (28) also pose a problem for the actualist account presented in §2.1.
Suppose that the chicken and the prawns are equally poisonous. Then ‘You ought not
order the chicken’ will be false if you actually end up ordering the prawns. This is because
the closest world where you don’t order chicken will be the actual world, which is a world
where you order the prawns. And the actual world will be just as bad as the closest world
where you order chicken.
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Moreover, this account leaves our second observation unexplained. It makes
Inheritance straightforwardly invalid, and predicts that conjunctions such
as (3a) should be true relative to fine:
(3a) # Prof. Procrastinate has to accept and write, but he doesn’t have
to accept.
In this respect, the account does no better than the other Inheritance-
rejecting views considered in §2.1.39
As for the account of Cariani (2016b), this proposal is closer to Kratzer’s
original semantics in that the alternatives are essentially only used to select
the worlds in the domain of quantification. The entry looks as follows:40
Cariani’s (2016b) semantics for ought
pought pq is true relative to 〈w,A,〉 iff every w ∈ top(A, )
is a p-world
This entry is essentially equivalent to our initial entry presented in §3.1.41
It makes Inheritance valid, and so explains why conjunctions such as (3a)
are abominable: they are always false. However, it doesn’t account for our
first cluster of observations, and is missing some crucial ingredients. Even if
we assume that (1a) is false relative to coarse, and (1b) is true relative to
fine, (1a) will then be true relative to fine, and (1b) will be false relative
to coarse. So, what needs to be clarified is why (1a) is evaluated with
respect to coarse, and (1b) is evaluated relative to fine. A major goal
of this paper has been to provide an explanation. So, although we think
that (Cariani, 2016b) is on the right track, it leaves some of our central
phenomena unaccounted for.42
Overall, neither of Cariani’s entries—on their own—provides us with a sat-
isfying explanation of our target observations.
39See (Bronfman & Dowell, 2018) for several other criticisms of Cariani’s (2013) seman-
tics.
40Cariani et al. (2013) present a similar entry. It is worth mentioning that Cariani
(2016b) is primarily interested in trying solve a different set of problems from those that
arise in the Procrastinate scenario, namely ones surrounding the way that deontic claims
interact with probabilities and conditional operators. It is beyond the scope of this paper
to consider how our theory could be used to address these latter puzzles.
41Strictly speaking, Cariani orders the alternatives in A by considering their intersection
with a background set of worlds, or information state. We could have used an information
state parameter in a similar way on our account, but since nothing hangs on it for our
purposes, we have opted for a simpler representation.
42Note that there is independent reason for Cariani to impose a representation re-
quirement on deontic modals. He treats modals such as ‘may’ and ‘permit’ as duals of
‘ought’/‘has to’:
Cariani’s (2016b) semantics for may
pmay pq is true relative to 〈w,A,〉 iff some w ∈ top(A, ) is a p-world
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4 Conclusion
We’ll close with a few remarks about the general status of Inheritance. Theo-
rists have challenged Inheritance on a variety of grounds, not just for reasons
stemming from scenarios such as Procrastinate.43 In this respect, our aims
in this paper have been relatively modest. We haven’t attempted to provide
a complete defense of Inheritance here. Instead, we focused on what we take
to be one of the most puzzling phenomena involving Inheritance, and tried
to show that a satisfying resolution of this puzzle can be provided. How
our account can be deployed to respond to other concerns involving Inher-
itance requires further investigation. But we are hopeful that our general
approach is on the right track, and will prove useful to theorists interested
in the semantics and pragmatics of deontic modals.
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